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ABSTRACT. 
 
This paper tests one of the fundamental assumptions of regional policy makers over the last 
20 years. Western governments, in seeking to attract internationally mobile capital have spent 
significant sums of public money on subsidies and grants. This is justified on the basis that 
the social returns to FDI are significantly greater than the private returns, due to productivity 
or technology spillovers from inward investors to domestic industry. However, this paper 
generates some estimates of these spillovers for both assisted areas and non-assisted areas in 
the UK, and questions the size of these social returns, arguing that productivity spillovers do 
not occur in regions where significant inward investment incentives are available.  
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1. INTRODUCTION. 
 
This paper examines one of the basic tenets of regional policy in both the developing 
and developed world over the past 20 years. This concerns the assumption that providing 
subsidies in order to attract inward investment to a country or region confers beneficial 
externalities on the host country or region that are over and above the direct employment 
gain. It is clear that the major rationale for local or regional Development Agencies seeking 
to attract foreign direct investment is the direct employment gain. It is also clear that in both 
the US and Europe, the “cost per job” of the investment incentives offered cannot be justified 
on the basis of the number of jobs directly associated with the investment alone. Morgan 
(1997) for example illustrates that the rationale of attracting inward investment has been 
firmly based on the assumption that certain indirect benefits from FDI will accrue to the 
domestic sector, in the form of technological, or productivity externalities. If this is the case, 
then the social returns to such investments are significant and may justify the large subsidies. 
This paper however will argue that that inward investment does very little to contribute to 
productivity growth in the domestic sector, and that any benefit where the inward investment 
is attracted through subsidy is negligible. 
Inward investment policies have been based on the assumed causal link between 
inward investment and regional development. The argument for subsidising inward 
investment is based on ‘superior’ multinational enterprises (MNEs) entering the domestic 
industry, and their advantages somehow being assimilated by the domestic sector. Part of this 
explanation is based on inter-industry adjustment, including a reallocation of resources to 
industry sectors of above average industry comparative advantage. On a regional level, new 
foreign manufacturing investment can also have beneficial economic consequences. In 
addition to job creation and resource transfer, foreign inward investments can also provide 
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technology and skills transfer to supplier and customer sectors. Multinational enterprise may 
then provide a basis for technology spillovers and the development of innovatory capacity in 
domestically owned sectors (Blomström and Kokko, 1996).  
There is evidence that spillovers do accrue to the domestic sector as a result of inward 
FDI, but only under certain circumstances, see for example Blomström et al (2001), or 
Markusen and Venables (1999). Blomström et al (2001) however argue that the regions in 
possession of significant location advantages, will be those best placed to gain most from the 
foreign presence. However, as Morgan (1997) notes, the policy of subsidising inward 
investment was designed to address the symptoms of regional disparities, such as 
unemployment, rather than the underlying causes, such as low levels of technological 
development. 
The remainder of the paper is divided as follows. Section two discusses inward 
investment policy and its likely effects, while section three discusses the potentially 
beneficial effects of inward investment. Section four develops the model along fairly standard 
lines, based on an augmented production function approach to test for the existence of 
externalities. Section five discusses the data and presents some descriptive statistics, and 
section six is then devoted to outlining some of the econometric issues with such models. 
Finally, sections seven and eight are devoted to results and conclusions.  
2. SUBSIDY FOR INWARD INVESTMENT IN THE UK. 
Western governments have spent significant sums of public money in attracting inward 
investment, and indeed it may even be argued that attracting (and retaining) inward 
investment has been the main focus of industrial and regional policy in the UK. The merits of 
various approaches to regional policy are discussed in some detail in Armstrong and Taylor 
(1993). Leaving aside the issue of whether governments should intervene to address regional 
disparity, the theoretical literature on regional policy makes one essential distinction. This 
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focuses on the debate concerning whether regional policy should be designed to address the 
symptoms of regional disparity such as unemployment and low levels of investment, or 
whether it should seek to address the underlying causes, such as low productivity and low 
levels of innovation. Largely, UK regional policy has been concerned to identify regions with 
high levels of unemployment that could benefit from new fixed capital formation.i A detailed 
description of the types of instruments that have been employed in the UK under the aegis of 
regional policy, are described for example in Armstrong (2001), DTI (2001) Harris and 
Robinson (2001) and the Armstrong and Taylor (1993).The main instrument that has been 
employed in the UK since the early 1980s is Regional Selective Assistance (RSA). This was 
introduced in 1972, and is discussed in detail in many standard texts, such as Armstrong and 
Taylor (1993). 
Taylor and Wren (1997) trace in some depth the changes in the administration of UK regional 
policy from the 1970s onwards, demonstrating that total spending on regional policy declined 
from 0.4% of GDP in the early 1980s, to 0.1% by the late 1990s. This apparent reduction is 
ascribed to a combination of better targeting of spending (and greater onus on the recipient 
firms to justify explicitly the need for support), and greater reliance on EU structural funds 
for the implementation of regional policy, albeit within the same assisted areasii. This period 
also saw a more careful redrafting of the Assisted Areas map in the UK, to target areas best 
placed to gain from such funding. As Wren (2002) demonstrates, regional assistance is much 
reduced compared with 25 years ago, with much stricter eligibility criteria, but it still 
essentially takes the form of investment subsidies to the private sectoriii. As such, regional 
policy and attracting internationally mobile capital, particularly in assisted areas, have 
become synonymous.  
As Harris and Robinson (2001) outline in some detail, RSA is a capital subsidy designed to 
stimulate employment in regions with above average unemployment.iv. Recipients of RSA 
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must be operating in Assisted Areas, and in practice most recipients have been in the 
manufacturing sector. Harris and Robinson (2001) provide a detailed breakdown by sector of 
the recipients of RSA, showing that RSA recipients accounted for an average of 8.4% of 
manufacturing employment over the period 1990-1998. RSA is concentrated in larger firms, 
and by definition in the peripheral areas of the UK. In Wales and Scotland for example, RSA 
recipients account for approximately a quarter of manufacturing employment, while the 
corresponding figures for the North of England and the West Midlands were 18.7% and 
11.7% respectively. Harris and Robinson (2001) also show that RSA is over-represented 
among foreign establishments. This is perhaps not surprising, and fits with the stylised “fact” 
of MNEs being attracted by subsidies, particularly to areas of high unemployment and 
(therefore) low wages. This is discussed at length in Munday et al (2001). 
For the time period with which this paper is largely concerned, there were 11 
Standard Planning regions of the UKv, and the following table provides an indication of the 
relative size of the assisted areas within each regionvi. Table 1 illustrates the extent to which 
one can make a distinction between “assisted area” and “non-assisted area” regions, with very 
large proportions of the peripheral areas of the UK (Northern Ireland, Wales, Scotland and 
the North of England) being covered by assisted areas status.   
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Table 1. The importance of Assisted Area status by region. 
 
 Share of total regional employment 
that is within assisted areas 
Share of foreign-owned  employment 
regional that is within assisted areas 
 1984 1988 1992 1996vii 1984 1988 1992 1996 
North 83% 81% 84% 84% 81% 80% 71% 73% 
Yorkshire & 
Humberside 
 
17% 
 
9% 
 
7% 
 
6% 
 
18% 
 
6% 
 
9% 
 
6% 
East 
Midlands 
 
3% 
 
3% 
 
4% 
 
3% 
 
2% 
 
1% 
 
3% 
 
4% 
East Anglia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South East 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South West 14% 8% 8% 0 5% 1% 3% 0 
West 
Midlands 
 
72% 
 
72% 
 
72% 
 
58% 
 
71% 
 
70% 
 
65% 
 
60% 
North West 43% 46% 54% 59% 46% 46% 66% 67% 
Wales  96% 94% 98% 96% 98% 96% 94% 96% 
Scotland 76% 72% 73% 71% 80% 79% 70% 73% 
Northern 
Ireland 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
Source: Report on the Census of Production, and UK Office of National Statistics, various years 
 
This illustrates the clear distinction between those regions that are able to offer 
investment incentives (to foreign or domestic companies) and those that are not. Regions with 
assisted area status are able to offer greater financial incentives to potential investors (both 
domestic and foreign), and thus would be expected to attract large proportions of new inward 
investment. Nijkamp and Blaas (1995) demonstrate for example that the European Regional 
Development Fund has influenced private investment rates across European Regions. Wren 
and Taylor (1999) go one stage further, demonstrating that investment incentives have had 
the effect of changing the regional distribution of economic activity across the UK in general. 
It is clear that investment incentives have had the effect of encouraging firms to locate in 
away from regions that demonstrate more obvious location advantage.  
 
Table 2, illustrating nominal productivity across the foreign and domestic firms across 
assisted areas and non-assisted areas provides an alternative comparison between assisted 
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areas and non-assisted area regions. There is a discernable productivity gap between foreign 
and domestic firms, and between assisted areas and non-assisted areas, but this gap did not 
widen over the period.  
Table 2. Productivity estimates for the foreign and domestic sectors. 
 
 Domestic sector Foreign sector 
 1984 1988 1992 1996 1984 1988 1992 1996 
Non-assisted areas 21268 33079 35945 38989 31918 47352 53492 57842 
Assisted areasviii 19951 30574 32729 34500 28026 41395 45162 48122 
 
Value added/ manual worker, money values. Source, UK Office of National Statistics 
 
Table 2 also illustrates one of the points made by Morgan (1997), that regions with large 
scale assisted area status are those characterised by low levels of capital intensity, and low 
levels of skill intensity, as well as lower levels of value added.  
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the regional dispersion of FDI across the UK, and also the 
extent to which this is concentrated in areas where financial assistance is available. Inward 
investment in several regions is heavily concentrated in assisted areas, particularly in the 
peripheral regions of the UK, such as Wales, Northern Ireland and the North of England. 
Clearly the South East is the dominant region in terms of attracting FDI, while 3 other 
regions have significantly increased their inward investment flows, most notably the East 
Midlands which saw investment by foreign firms increase by more than 500% over the 
period.  
Figures 1 and 2 here 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the importance of FDI for regional development, illustrating that 
inward investment accounts for some 35% of new capital expenditure in UK manufacturing. 
FDI is not evenly distributed across the UK, with inward investment in many of the 
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peripheral areas of the UK accounting for as much as half of total investment. This proportion 
was rising throughout the period. 
 
Figure 3 here 
The figures and tables presented here suggest many of the direct benefits to a host 
country of attracting inward investment, most of which are well understood. Inward 
investment will act to improve aggregate productivity as foreign firms in the UK a 
demonstrable productivity advantage over domestic UK firms, and indeed Davies and Lyons 
(1992) examine this in some detail. It is also likely that inward investment will improve the 
host country’s balance of payments position by increasing exports as well as engaging in 
import substitution, and that productivity will increase as resources are reallocated to more 
efficient producers. All of this is secondary however to the fundamental justification for 
subsidising inward investment, which is to generate employment. Many studies have argued 
however that the size of subsidies employed to attract inward investment cannot be justified 
in terms of direct and indirect employment alone, that an addition externality in the form of 
productivity growth in the domestic sector must occur for such subsidies to be cost effective.  
3. THE POTENTIAL FOR SPILLOVERS FROM INWARD INVESTMENT.  
Blomström and Kokko (1996) provide several reasons why technology is expected to 
transfer from MNEs to domestic firms. This can occur directly, through the licensing of a 
particular technology, through supplier networks or subcontracting arrangements, or 
indirectly as knowledge becomes public and spillovers are assimilated by the domestic sector.  
However, these models of the impact of FDI, also assume an adverse effect on the 
domestic sector. Markusen and Venables (1999) outline the two main impacts on local firms 
of inward investment, as do Aitken and Harrison (1999). In addition to the standard 
productivity gains argument, Aitken and Harrison  (1999) explain a further impact of a large 
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MNE entering an industry. The foreign firm captures some of the domestic firms’ market 
shares, forcing them to operate at a smaller scale, reducing output and (possibly) increasing 
unit cost. This is expected to be significant in imperfectly competitive markets, and is similar 
to the result reported by Driffield and Munday (1998)ix.  
Buffie (1993) expresses particular concerns that inward investment simply has the 
effect of reducing domestic output. Holden and Swales (1995) discuss the importance of 
displacement, particularly in the context of regional policy. They show that, with the advent 
of more discretionary investment or employment subsidies, then the impact on the incumbent 
firms may be greater than otherwise anticipated, and displacement of such output or 
employment increased.  
Given the existence of a foreign productivity advantage, productivity or technological 
spillovers from inward investment are dependent on two phenomena. Following the 
arguments by Blomström and Kokko (1996), Driffield (2001) or Porter (1996) for example, 
the scale and scope of spillovers from inward investment are determined by the ability of the 
domestic sector to assimilate the imported technology, and the extent to which agglomeration 
contributes to this. As such, domestic firms in the less technologically advanced regions of 
the UK may be less able to assimilate the new technology that may accompany FDI. The 
regions with assisted area status are also by definition those with high levels of 
unemployment, and a low skill base, so expansion through technological advance may be 
hindered in such regions. As such therefore, while previous studies suggest that spillovers 
may occur as a result of FDI, such externalities may be confined to those areas with a higher 
skill base, and with higher levels of productivity, viz. the areas of the UK not covered by 
Assisted Area status. Secondly, Assisted Areas are by definition less likely to generate 
agglomeration economies, and so by encouraging inward investment away from the core 
regions, much of the potential indirect benefit from FDI may be lost.  
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In a similar vein, there is significant evidence that such Development Agencies are not only 
actively competing to attract international capital (Lovering (1999), Young et al (1994), 
Gripaios et al (1997)), but in more recent years have been concerned to contain any spillovers 
from FDI within their region. Wren (2002) outlines examples of these policies, designed to 
increase the scale and scope of local spillovers from FDIx. However, while the extent to 
which such policies are likely to succeed has been questioned, Armstrong (2001), Wren 
(2002), it is never the less clear that such agencies have sought where possible to maximise 
local linkages from inward investment. Porter (1996) argues that policies designed to increase 
local sourcing will lead to a loss in overall agglomeration economies and will be to the 
detriment of other regions and possibly to the economy as a whole. As Porter (1996) shows, 
such effects are likely to be exacerbated where the location advantage (to which the MNE 
was initially attracted) has taken the form of an investment subsidy, rather than endowment 
based sources of comparative advantage. For technology spillovers to be assimilated by the 
domestic firms, the domestic sector must be sufficiently technologically advanced. While this 
is often a problem associated with developing countries, it is never the less still a problem in 
the West, Blomström (2000), Driffield (2001). 
Based on the above discussion, it is possible to outline several hypotheses: 
 One would expect spillovers to occur as a result of inward investment, however:  
 These are likely to be limited geographically, and less likely to be significant 
across industries.  
 The “crowding out” or competitive effect may outweigh any positive technology 
effect at the industry level. 
 Spillovers will be greater where FDI has not simply been attracted by subsidy, and 
as such likely to be greater in non-assisted areas.  
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This paper therefore employs three measures of inward investment penetration: The first is a 
measure of FDI within the industry and the region of the domestic firm. The second measures 
FDI that occurs within the industry of the investment across all other regions, while the third 
is inward investment that occurs across all other industries within the region of the domestic 
firm. These three measures then capture three potential spillover effects, a local industry-
specific effect, a general regional effect and a national industry level effect.  
4. MEASUREMENT OF PRODUCTIVITY EXTERNALITIES. 
There is a relatively large literature, following Caballero and Lyons (1989, 1990, 
1992), which essentially seeks to encompass the spillovers at an industry level that occur as a 
result of an increase in external output expansions. The general approach employed in the 
spillovers literature, is to begin with an augmented production function of the following type: 
logQirt = a + 1ln(Kirt) + 2ln(NLirt) + 3ln(MLirt) + t + irtnk k X 1  + uirt  ….(1) 
Where Q represents output, K represents the capital stock of the firm; labour is divided into 
manual (ML) and non-manual labour (NL). The subscripts i, r and t refer to industry, region 
and time respectively. This therefore relates the vector of externalities to total factor 
productivity growth in the sector concerned. This methodology is discussed at length in 
Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984), and more specifically in the context of spillovers from FDI 
in Aitken and Harrison (1999) or Driffield (2001). Domestic total factor productivity in 
equation 1 is therefore related to the stock of foreign owned capital as the externality 
variable. Crucially, the measure of foreign investment employed here is the stock of capital in 
foreign owned or controlled firms. This is calculated on a perpetual inventory method using 
net capital expenditure with a 10% depreciation rate. The model therefore relates total factor 
productivity in the domestic sector, to the stock of inward investment. Given how the stock of 
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inward investment is calculated, this places more weight on new investment. This also 
therefore excludes capital flows that occur simply as a result of acquisitions for example.  
Oulton (1996) discusses at length the potential problems with this approach, although 
many of these are essentially accounting problems at the macro level. One of the potential 
problems is that the error term from equation (1) may be related to aggregate output growth, 
thus deriving spurious evidence of externalities. The papers by Oulton (1996) and others, 
following Caballero and Lyons (1990) however, are concerned with a more general form of 
externality than that considered here. The focus here is a more specific question, the existence 
of spillovers from inward investment, rather than whether output spillovers exist per se. The 
sources of potential investment spillovers here are tightly defined and a causal relationship 
between FDI and domestic productivity growth is assumed, so it is unlikely that the 
‘spillover’ variable will be related to the error termxi. 
5. ECONOMETRIC CONSIDERATIONS 
The usefulness of panel data for estimating productivity growth is now well 
understood, based on the initial work of Mankiw et al (1992), or in the context of industrial 
economics studies of externalities, on Caballero and Lyons (1989, 1990, 1992). In addition 
however, Islam (1992) shows that a dynamic specification is appropriate, as growth is in part 
dependent on past performance, and past input levels.  
lnQirt = a + lnQirt-1 +1ln(Kirt) + 2ln(NLirt) + 3ln(MLirt) +t +  16 4  irtk k X  + virt ….(2) 
where X is the vector of externalities from FDI outlined above and t is a time trend, 
included as a proxy for exogenous technological change. 
However, it is then suggested that there are time specific, and observation (industry) specific 
effects. 
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Such that virt = ir + t+ uirt    ….(3) 
The standard manner of estimating this, with such panel data, is to convert (2) to first 
differences, to remove the individual effects, which by construction are correlated with the 
lagged dependent variable, and estimate the ‘fixed effects’ model.  
lnQirt = lnQirt-1 + 1ln(Kirt) + 2ln(NLirt) + 3ln(MLirt) + + 16 4   irtk k X  
+uirt….(4) 
As such therefore, domestic total factor productivity growth is related to lagged changes in 
the (log of the) stock of FDI. 
As is well understood, the GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1988, 1991) can 
be applied to estimate (4), which generates heteroscedastic-consistent estimates. The lagged 
dependent variable becomes endogenous and so must be instrumented using further lags. 
There is a concern that with this type of estimation of what is essentially a “growth” model, 
that the estimate of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable has an upward bias, if the 
panel data exhibits significant heterogeneity, see Pesaran and Smith (1995). There is no 
definitive test for this, and the various suggested estimators are designed for panels with a 
long time series, but narrow cross sections, see for example Lee et al (1998) who discuss the 
application of the “mean group” estimator. Lee et al (1995) however also show that biased 
estimates may be produced with the mean group estimator for T as large as 30. One possible 
test with these data is to allow for slope dummies in the lagged dependent variable, allowing 
 to vary across industries or across regions. Standard specification tests however reject the 
inclusion of such variables, suggesting that heterogeneity is not a problem. 
The essential purpose of this paper is to determine whether productivity spillovers that occur 
as a result of inward investment are different for assisted areas (that is areas that subsidise 
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inward investment) and non-assisted areas. There are numerous ways of addressing this, one 
could estimate equation (4) for the full sample, and test whether 4, 5 and 6 differ (either 
jointly or separately) between assisted areas and non-assisted areas. This however presents a 
problem. As is well understood, assisted areas are characterised by high levels of 
unemployment and low levels of investment. However, it is generally argued that these are 
merely symptoms of the underlying problems such as low productivity growth, low skill 
levels and low levels of technological development. It is inappropriate therefore in a model of 
productivity growth to treat assisted areas status as an exogenous variable (as a region’s 
assisted areas status is partly determined by past levels of output or productivity). This would 
also involve imposing a restriction of the same production function coefficients across 
assisted areas and non-assisted areas’ industries, which again is likely to be an invalid 
restriction. The appropriate methodology is therefore to divide the sample using the 
endogenous variable (assisted areas status) and estimate (4) for the two sub-samples 
separately. This is discussed further in section 7.  
 
6. THE DATA 
The data used here are industry and regional level data for the UK, covering 1984-
1997xii. For the first (second) part of the sample there are 20 (23) manufacturing sectors, 11 
(11) standard planning regions, and, giving 220 (243) observations per year. The advantage 
of such data, is that they allow one to evaluate inter- and intra-regional effects, as well as 
inter-, and intra- industry effects. The measures of inward investment that are then used as 
potential sources of externalities are; foreign investment at the regional level, at the industry 
level, and also at the industry and regional level. The data were gathered from the Annual 
Production Inquiry (formerly the Census of Production), and directly from the UK Office of 
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National Statistics, who provided the data on the foreign owned sector alone, to allow the 
calculation of the domestically owned sector. 
All monetary values of data used in the econometric analysis are in real terms (1984 prices), 
deflated by the relevant sectoral level consumer price index (available on 
Datastream).  
Q represents domestic industry output: this is measured using gross value added of the 
domestic sector at the industry and regional level.  
K is the capital stock of the domestic industry. This is calculated using a perpetual inventory 
method employing capital expenditure (i.e. real investment) data over the previous 3 years. A 
depreciation rate of 10% is used, and the data expressed in real terms.   
ML is employment of manual workers (operatives) in domestic owned industry at the 
regional and industry level. 
NL is employment of non-manual workers (non-operatives) in domestic owned industry at 
the regional and industry level. 
For the latter sample, there is no distinction between manual and non-manual workers, so 
labour enters the production function as a single input, L. 
Measures of inward investment. 
The stock of foreign capital is calculated using a perpetual inventory method employing 
capital expenditure (i.e. real investment) data over the previous 3 years. A depreciation rate 
of 10% is used, and the data expressed in real terms.   
Three measures of inward investment penetration are then included in the analysis. 
These are all included in log form in the regressions. 
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FDIirt The stock of foreign capital in the relevant industry and region for the 
previous year. 
FDIit The stock of foreign capital in the relevant industry across all regions 
for the previous year. 
FDIrt The stock of foreign capital in the relevant region across all industries 
for the previous year. 
7. RESULTS. 
 
Equation (4) was estimated for the assisted and non-assisted areas separately. The 
North West region was omitted from both samples, as it clearly lies between the 2 categories. 
It would be erroneous to include the North West as a non-assisted area, but equally a large 
proportion of inward investment in the North West has not attracted RSA. Sensitivity analysis 
indicates that including the North West in either group does not change the results or 
inferences significantly in either direction. The results derived for the two sub-samples are 
given in tables 4 and 5. 
Table 4  & 5 here 
For both sub-samples, the (internal) production function variables behave much as 
expected and all are significant. The results are also consistent across the two time periods. 
However, there is significantly more evidence of exogenous technological change in the “non 
assisted areas” group, suggesting that productivity growth may be faster here than in the 
peripheral areas of the UK. There is also evidence that skilled labour generates a greater 
proportion of value added in the non-assisted areas than in the assisted areas, which are more 
likely to be unskilled-labour intensive. The lagged dependent variable has a greater value for 
the non-assisted sample, suggesting that past performance is a more important determinant of 
total factor productivity in the non-assisted areas sample. Overall, standard specification tests 
reject the restriction of imposing a single production function on these two groups, suggesting 
that the technology employed in domestic industry differs between assisted areas and non-
assisted areas. 
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The main result from a policy perspective is that there is evidence at the regional level 
of spillovers from FDI. The coefficient on FDIirt is significant and positive for the non-
assisted group, suggesting that FDI generates productivity growth within the same industry 
and region as the investment. However, while the coefficient on FDIirt approaches 
significance for the latter sample of assisted areas, overall these results suggest that these 
spillovers are confined to the non-assisted area regions of the UK.  This is the variable that 
theoretically is most likely to demonstrate an externality, as it is both industry, and region 
specific. It is interesting that for the later sample, this coefficient is positive, though small and 
barely significant. This suggests that spillovers from FDI in assisted areas may well have 
increased in recent years, though only at a local intra-industry level. Turning to the more 
general measures of productivity externalities through FDI, the results are in line with what is 
expected. The coefficient on FDIit, that is the measure of FDI that is only industry-specific, is 
consistent across the two groups. In both cases, the coefficient is negative, and is suggestive 
of the crowding out effect, outlined by Aitken and Harrison (1999) or Buffie (1993). 
Specifically, this result suggests that FDI generates a short term loss in productivity at the 
industry level, due to a reduction in scale of the domestic sector, following expansion of the 
foreign owned sector. These results also suggest that FDI, in say the South East of England, 
will have a detrimental effect on industries in peripheral regions, which is directly opposite to 
the aim of regional policy and the use of investment incentives. Finally, the region-specific 
measure of FDI again perhaps not surprisingly, provides tentative evidence of productivity 
growth following FDI at the regional level, but again only for non assisted areas. This is 
rather worrying, as assisted area regions tend to be on the periphery of the UK, Wales, 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and the North of England for example, and it is these areas that 
have spent sizable amounts attracting inward investment.xiii There is no apparent difference in 
these results between the two time frames. This is perhaps surprising, given the greater 
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emphasis on targeting of projects that local agencies have placed on subsidies on recent 
years, with accompanying policies designed to boost spillovers within the local economy. 
8. CONCLUSION 
The impact of inward investment on productivity growth or technological advance has 
been of interest for some time, particularly given the large investment incentives that are 
offered to multinational companies to locate in particular regions. These results suggest that 
spillovers from FDI do occur, but are only significant where the inward investment is 
motivated by the desire to exploit firm specific advantages generated elsewhere. Even in this 
case, the beneficial effects are limited to the region that has been able to attract the 
investment. There is also evidence that inward investment exerts a negative impact on 
productivity growth in the domestic sector. This may only be short term, but is suggestive of 
the crowding out effect exerted by inward investors on domestic firms. It is of course possible 
that in welfare terms, this particular adverse effect may be offset in the long term through an 
overall increase in allocative efficiency, and through balance of payments gains. 
The evidence presented here not only raises concerns regarding the social returns of 
spending public money on attracting inward investment, but also questions the extent to 
which inward investment can contribute to regional development beyond the direct 
employment effects. This mirrors the concerns expressed by Porter (1996), that where the 
main motivation for attracting FDI are investment incentives then inward investment makes 
only a negligible contribution to regional development. From a policy perspective this raises 
several challenges for local development agencies. Firstly, there is some evidence that the 
increased targeting of projects, and tighter criteria for firms receiving subsidies has acted to 
improve the social returns to inward investment. This would suggest that more should be 
done locally to “embed” inward investment into the domestic economy, not only as 
purchasers of local output, but also suppliers to local firms. In this way, the technology 
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inherent in the FDI will transferred more efficiently to domestic producers. There is clearly a 
role here for development agencies becoming more active in encouraging knowledge 
transfers within the locality rather than merely as suppliers of subsidy. There is evidence that 
policy is moving in this direction, but as yet there is only limited evidence of technological 
externalities flowing from this. 
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Figure 1: Foreign Investment into the UK by Region 
Net capital expenditure by foreign owned firms, £million, money values 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The importance of Regional assistance across areas: 
Regional assistance as a percentage of value added across the regions 
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Figure 3. The importance of inward investment across Regions. 
The percentage of net capital investment in the region carried out by foreign owned firms. 
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Table 4 : Results 1983-1992 
 
 Non-assisted areas Assisted areas  
Variable coefficient 
(t values) 
coefficient 
(t values) 
time 0.124** 
(2.56) 
0.051* 
(1.89) 
Kirt 0.153** 
(5.08) 
0.210** 
(4.39) 
NLirt 0.209** 
(5.23) 
0.144** 
(5.24) 
MLirt 0.433** 
(6.26) 
0.449** 
(5.15) 
Qirt-1 0.234** 
(2.67) 
0.197** 
(2.63) 
FDIirt 0.063** (2.43) 
-0.0013 
(0.85) 
FDIit -0.034** (2.01) 
-0.028** 
(2.10) 
FDIrt 0.029* (1.97) 
0.014 
(1.01) 
Spatial autocorrelation 
(Morans I) 
1.151 
(0.250) 
1.128 
(0.259) 
Time dummies Yes yes 
Specification 
2(5)xiv 
5.187 
(p= 0.394) 
8.472 
(p= 0.132) 
Sargan - p value 0.544 0.465 
Inclusion of further lags of 
FDI variables LR test 2(3) 
4.851 
(0.183) 
5.148 
(0.161) 
serial correlation 
AR(2)xv ~ 2(1) 
1.349 
p= 0.245 
1.561 
p= 0.2115 
N (6 years) 660 
(5 regions) 
660 
(5 regions) 
One step heteroscedastic - consistent standard errors. 
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Table 5 : Results 1993-1997 
 
 Non-assisted areas Assisted areas  
Variable coefficient 
(t values) 
coefficient 
(t values) 
time 0.077** 
(2.06) 
0.031 
(1.25) 
Kirt 0.301** 
(4.02) 
0.278** 
(3.65) 
Lirt 0.588** 
(7.84) 
0.609** 
(8.56) 
Qirt-1 0.088** 
(2.02) 
0.104** 
(2.54) 
FDIirt 0.088** (3.17) 
0.014 
(1.34)a 
FDIit -0.027* (1.92) 
-0.041** 
(2.09) 
FDIrt 0.019* (1.88) 
0.008 
(0.67) 
Spatial autocorrelation 
(Morans I) 
1.381 
(0.17) 
0.752 
(0.45) 
Time dummies Yes yes 
Specification 
2(4) 
4.863 
(0.302) 
5.964 
(0.202) 
Sargan - p value 0.254 0.657 
Inclusion of further lags of 
FDI variables LR test 2(3) 
3.588 
(0.310) 
2.485 
(0.478) 
serial correlation 
AR(2) ~ 2(1) 
0.845 
(0.358) 
0.982 
(0.322) 
N (2 years) 230 
5 regions 
230 
5 regions 
One step heteroscedastic - consistent standard errors. 
 
                                                 
i This recognises that there are certain areas of inner cities for example that may have above average 
unemployment, but that seeking to attract large scale investment is not feasible due to congestion or other 
constraints. This is an essential reason why regional policy is based on relatively large areas rather than very 
small jurisdictions.  
ii The units of analysis for the assisted areas map are the UK administrative regions that are the NUTS2 areas for 
EU comparison. The UK “assisted areas” are therefore the NUTS2 regions that have either objective 1 or 
objective 2 area status under EU regulations. 
iii The changes in the implementation of UK regional policy are discussed in great detail by Wren (2002).  
iv A ceiling is usually applied in terms of the “cost per job”. 
v This was increased to 13 in 1995 by separating London from the rest of the South East of England, and 
Merseyside from the rest of the North West of England. 
                                                 
a The p value for this t statistic is 0.182 
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vi The data that are used in this paper are from 1984 to 1992. There was a change in both regiona, and industry 
classifications in 1993, which breaks the series. There are not, as yet, sufficient years data available after ths 
break to allow the econometric analysis to be extended to the later period. 
vii 1996 data are not published in this form. I am grateful to the DTI for the provision of the assisted areas/non-
assisted areas split. 
viii The data presented here includes the North West in the assisted area group, as clearly a firm considering 
investing in this region has access to assisted area funding. However, if one excludes this region from the 
figures in table 2, then the differentials between assisted and non-assisted are even more marked. 
ix This phenomenon would still be expected in contestable markets. Theory suggests that firms in contestable 
markets operate at, or very close to their minimum effeicient scale. As such, entry by a (superior) MNE would 
result in a loss of market share for the domestic firm, thus forcing it back up its long run AC curve, increasing 
average costs. 
x Initiatives such as ‘source Wales’ are an explicit example of this, as Morgan (1997) outlines in some detail. 
xi See Oulton (1996) for a full discussion of this. Empirically this can be tested for using standard 
heteroskedasticity tests. 
xii There was a change in regional and industry classifications in 1993 for the UK, preventing consistent 
extension of the data.  
xiii Other variables, such as FDI in “related” industries (derived from input-output tables) or contiguous regions 
were also used, to test for inter-industry, or inter-regional effects. The t values on these variables, even when 
employed in the absence of all others, were less than 0.8, and so the variables were rejected from the regression.  
xiv This is based on testing the Cobb-Douglas specification against a translog specification. 
xv This LM test is outlined on Baltagi (1995) pp. 93 
